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9.1 Introduction
As a result of the recent wave of trade liberalization that has spread
around the world, there have recently been numerous attempts to study the
implications of opening up an economy. As a consequence, we now have
studies on the relationship between openness and growth, openness and
productivity, openness and relative wages, openness and regional distribu-
tion of economic activity, and so on. Some of these studies have been used
to test implications of basic trade theory models (Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, industrial concentration models, etc.),
while others have tested more recently developed implications of geo-
graphy and trade models (agglomeration eﬀects, regional dispersion ef-
fects, etc.).1
An outcome of this growing branch of the economic literature is that we
now have an important body of empirical evidence regarding these eﬀects.
Unfortunately, in many aspects of this literature we have contradictory
empirical evidence. For example, on the one hand, there are results show-
ing a positive eﬀect of trade on growth (Sachs and Warner 1995). However,
there are also other studies that have a more skeptical view about the ro-
bustness of such a relationship (i.e., Rodrik and Rodriguez 2000). Some-
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1. A far-from-exhaustive list includes papers by Edwards (1998), Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2004), Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright (2002), Hanson (1998b), and Fujita and Hu (2001).thing similar occurs with the implications of the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem.2
In this paper we take a diﬀerent approach to study some of the economic
implications of the commercial policy. Instead of focusing on a situation of
opening up an economy, we focus on the opposite situation, namely, the
closing of an economy. For that purpose, we focus on an economy that was
recently opened and that has been the subject of many of the empirical
studies mentioned previously: Mexico.
Mexico is an economy that substantially reduced its tariﬀ and nontariﬀ
barriers, starting in the mid-eighties (Tornell and Esquivel 1997). Later on,
in the early 1990s, Mexico joined NAFTA and eﬀectively became a very
open economy. However, despite the fact that we know that the Mexican
economy was relatively closed in the early 1980s, it is not quite clear how
long the Mexican economy had been closed. In this paper we argue that,
even though the Mexican industry has been protected for a long period,
which in some cases goes back to the late nineteenth century, the structure
of protection that existed in the Mexican economy in the second half of the
twentieth century comes from an important modiﬁcation in the commer-
cial policy that took place around 1947.
We then use this result to analyze two economic implications of closing
an economy. First, we study the impact of closing the economy on the rel-
ative wages and employment levels of skilled and unskilled workers in the
Mexican industry between 1945 and 1965. Second, we study the regional
dispersion of economic activity that took place in Mexico between 1945
and 1965. For that matter, we apply recently developed methodologies to
analyze the opening up of an economy in order to analyze the inverse situ-
ation: that is, the closing of an economy. In principle, we should expect that
the eﬀects of closing an economy should be exactly the opposite of open-
ing up an economy.
The objective of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, we show how the
Mexican economy got closed in the mid-twentieth century. In order to do
that, we revisit the empirical evidence on tariﬀ and nontariﬀ protection in
the ﬁrst half of the century and we also document the structural change in
the protection scheme for the Mexican industry that took place after 1947.
On the other hand, we evaluate two economic implications of closing an
economy. This evaluation may be seen as an additional test of whether the
economy was indeed closed in those years, but could also be seen as an
evaluation of some implications of standard international trade theory
models.
Besides this introduction, the structure of this chapter is as follows: sec-
tion 9.2 describes Mexico’s commercial policy in the past century, with an
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2. See Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) and the references cited therein (see also Davis
2005).emphasis on the change of the instrument being used by the Mexican au-
thorities. Section 9.3 evaluates the implication of the protectionist policy
on the wage and employment of skilled and unskilled workers. Section 9.4
evaluates the implications of the protectionist policy in the dispersion of
regional economic activity in Mexico after the implementation of quanti-
tative restrictions on foreign goods. Finally, in section 9.5 we present our
conclusions.
9.2 Protectionism in Mexico: A Brief Historical Review
Recent scholarship on commercial policy has demonstrated that protec-
tionism in Latin America had its origins in the nineteenth century.3 On the
one hand, ﬁscal and administrative goals fueled high tariﬀs and imparted
an inertial component to tariﬀ levels. On the other, deliberate eﬀorts to
promote manufacturing also drove tariﬀ rates upward across the region.
In the case of Mexico, its commercial policy featured a strong ﬁscal com-
ponent until the mid-1880s, when the Porﬁrian regime (1876–1911) used
tariﬀ rate changes to create a structure of protection conducive to import
substitution, where ﬁnished goods generally held higher tariﬀ rates than
machinery and inputs. To protect the economy, the Mexican government
established speciﬁc rates for a range of goods. However, these tariﬀs lost
their protective power over time due to the continuous increases in import
prices (in terms of silver pesos) between 1892 and 1902, as shown in f ﬁgure
9.1.4
Besides tariﬀ protection, Mexican manufacturers also beneﬁted from
the devaluation of the domestic currency (the silver peso). As a result of the
continuous depreciation of the local currency in international markets, the
exchange rate became an additional source of protection for domestic pro-
ducers. Even though rising prices in pesos eroded protection conferred by
speciﬁc tariﬀs during the 1890s, the exchange rate protection sheltered do-
mestic industry from foreign competition. Once Mexico joined the gold
standard in 1905, the exchange rate protection came to an end, and thus
domestic producers had to increasingly rely on import duties as a source of
protection. Indeed, between 1905 and 1911, textile, iron and steel, cement,
and beer producers succeeded in negotiating protective tariﬀs for their
manufactures in accordance with the industrial promotion goals of the
Porﬁrian regime.
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3. See Coatsworth and Williamson (2004) and Haber (2006).
4. We are aware that the measure of protection used in ﬁgure 9.1, the ratio of total tariﬀ
revenues to total value of imports, could be misleading, since extremely high tariﬀs may dis-
courage imports. Yet, we lack any other measure of protection suitable for long-run compar-
isons. Nonetheless, there is evidence that this ratio approximates reasonably well the direction
of protection and correlates well with more precise measures of protection. According to
Bueno (1972), the rank correlation between nominal and eﬀective protection for 1960 was
0.87 (see also Mexico, Nacional Financiera 1971, 141–42).The Mexican Revolution, which started in 1910, brought about modiﬁ-
cations in the design of Mexico’s commercial policy. The new policy con-
sisted of a simultaneous increase in protection levels for various sectors,
therefore breaking the emphasis on industrial protection that was charac-
teristic of the late Porﬁriato. Indeed, ﬁscal deﬁcits forced the federal gov-
ernment to decree tariﬀ increases to all types of goods in the same percent-
age. Beginning in 1915, the government decreed tariﬀ reductions aimed at
curbing inﬂationary pressures, aﬀecting consumption goods, particularly
foodstuﬀs and coarse cotton textiles. Thus, in 1920 the average nominal
tariﬀ rate was signiﬁcantly lower than in the Porﬁrian era (see ﬁgure 9.1).
During the 1920s, negotiation among sectors was the driving force be-
hind tariﬀ rate changes. Most tariﬀ modiﬁcations emerged as recommen-
dations of the Tariﬀ Commission, where representatives from industrial-
ists, labor unions, merchants, and government oﬃcials deliberated over a
wide range of demands for protection. In general, tariﬀlevels increased for
manufactured ﬁnal goods. However, other sectors such as agricultural and
intermediate products also beneﬁted from tariﬀprotection, thanks to pres-
sures exerted by agricultural and industrial interests.
9.1.1 Tariﬀ Policy, 1929–1946
In November 1929, the Executive decreed a new Trade Ordinance, the
ﬁrst since 1891. A substantial part of the Ordinance was the tariﬀ sched-
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Fig. 9.1 Total duties as a percentage of total imports, 1892–1960ule, listing 2,771 categories and their corresponding speciﬁc duties. The
Tariﬀ Commission played an important role in drafting the new schedule.
Over the years, the number of modiﬁcations had become a major obstacle
to importers who needed to know an ever-changing classiﬁcation and its
rates.
The Tariﬀ Commission not only compiled the long series of tariﬀ rate
modiﬁcations and updated classiﬁcations to avoid undertaxation of high-
value products that fall into generic categories, but it also increased tariﬀ
rates. Most of the increases responded to the incorporation of consular
fees and other surcharges formerly assessed on import duties.5As shown in
ﬁgure 9.1, the average tariﬀ rose to 28 percent in 1930, elevating this indi-
cator above the averages reached in the 1920s and reaching a similar level
to the one achieved at the end of the Porﬁrian era in 1910.6
Although the cascading structure of the late Porﬁrian regime had been
blurred by generalized rate increases on intermediate goods that were ap-
proved during the 1920s, the structure of protection revealed that tariﬀs
still served as a device to promote manufacturing activities.7In terms of the
structure of the tariﬀ, clothing and textiles bore the heaviest duties, rang-
ing from 40 to 100 percent. Duties on agricultural products and foodstuﬀs
competing with domestic production also increased to levels above 40 per-
cent, showing an intention to cater to the demands of strong political sup-
porters of the political regime that emerged after the Revolution of 1910.
A third group, consisting of iron and steel products, alcoholic beverages,
and other manufactures exhibited import duties above 25 percent. At the
bottom end were duties on raw materials, machinery, and equipment.8
Currency devaluations in the 1930s and the early 1940s (1930–33, 1938–
39, and 1941) eroded the protective power of speciﬁc tariﬀs because of the
inverse relationship of speciﬁc rates and import prices in pesos. During the
1930s, relatively few tariﬀ rate changes were speciﬁcally addressed to sat-
isfy the demands for protection in import-competing industrial branches.
In contrast, major tariﬀ revisions occurred as a response to balance-of-
payments problems and due to the need to curtail imports. Thiswas the ca-
sein 1937 when the Executive decreed increases for 633 categories. Further
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5. See U.S. Tariﬀ Commission (1942).
6. Cárdenas (1987) argues that there exists a bias in the implicit tariﬀ after 1929 because a
higher level of nominal protection simply reﬂected the inclusion of consular fees and other
surcharges (see Cárdenas 1987, 104).
7. For a more detailed discussion on the changes in the structure of the tariﬀs between 1905
and 1930 see Márquez (2001).
8. The general description of the structure of protection is drawn from Oﬁcina de Estudios
Especiales del Comité de Aforos y Subsidios al Comercio Exterior, 1946, 241–42. Other esti-
mates of ad valorem rates by group of products or individual categories conﬁrm the structure
of protection just described: clothing (68.91 percent), textiles (59.39 percent), foodstuﬀs
(31.57 percent), iron and steel products (33.94 percent), coarse unbleached cloth (76.4 per-
cent), and ﬁne unbleached cloth (84.5 percent). For group estimates of nominal protection see
Márquez (2001); for cloth categories see Gómez-Galvarriato, in this volume.increases in speciﬁc tariﬀs for 233 categories took place during the follow-
ing year.
Figure 9.1 shows that in 1938, the average nominal rate of protection
reached its highest level since 1934. Later, a revision in 1940 changed clas-
siﬁcations but left rates practically unaltered (U.S. Tariﬀ Commission
1942, 181). The few tariﬀ rate changes that took place in Mexico between
1940 and 1947 coincided with the unavailability of imports associated with
trade disturbances provoked by WWII. Furthermore, in an inﬂationary
context, a passive commercial policy meant the erosion of existing tariﬀ
rates (average nominal protection in 1940 reached 15.55 percent, and de-
clined to 8.40 percent in 1947). It is worth noting that a declining nomi-
nal protection did not hinder manufacturing growth: in fact, the Mexican
economy grew at an annual average rate of 7.3 percent, whereas the man-
ufacturing sector achieved an average growth rate above 10 percent in the
period 1940–45.9
The ﬂexibility in the design and management of commercial policy in the
1930s allowed the government to accommodate tariﬀrate changes to ﬁscal
needs, balance-of-payment problems, or demands for protection. A yearly
authorization from Congress allowed the Executive to decree tariﬀ rate
changes as it deemed necessary. Thus, the design of commercial policy re-
sponded to the behavior of revenues and the commercial deﬁcit as well as
to recommendations from the Tariﬀ Commission. In the late 1930s and
early 1940s, two forces from institutional changes limited the ability of the
government to modify tariﬀ policy. First, a Constitutional reform of Au-
gust 1938 ruled that tariﬀ legislation was an exclusive attribution of the
Federal Congress. Therefore, the Executive no longer had the power to in-
troduce changes in tariﬀ rates in a discretional manner. The need of con-
gressional approval limited the ability of the Executive to introduce tariﬀ
rate changes according to diﬀerent economic policy goals.
Second, the commercial agreement between Mexico and the United
States, in eﬀect since 1943, also contributed to further reduce the ﬂexibil-
ity of commercial policy. Among the provisions of the agreement was the
obligation to maintain the level of duties for 120 tariﬀ categories. A No-
vember 1943 decree increased tariﬀ rates of nearly 600 categories, but it
was later revoked before it went into eﬀect. According to Sanford Mosk
(1954, 70), Mexican oﬃcials ruled out duty increases after the U.S. gov-
ernment claimed that “tariﬀincreases violated the spirit, if not the letter, of
the Mexican-American trade agreement.” A year later, Mexican authori-
ties approved tariﬀ increases again, but it only aﬀected a small fraction of
the categories projected in 1943. Protective and ﬁscal concerns continued
driving duty increases in the following three years.
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9. On the role of tariﬀ protection and other policy instruments on the growth record in the
period 1940–46 see King (1970, 22–32).Because of the nature of the revisions in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
the structure of the tariﬀ changed little in terms of the stimulus that tariﬀ
protection provided to manufacturers. Finished products remained as the
most heavily protected sector, whereas raw materials and machinery tariﬀs
were signiﬁcantly lower than the rest of the sectors. In table 9.1, the decline
in nominal protection is apparent (measured as equivalent ad valorem
rates) between 1935 and 1944, but it is also noticeable that the structure of
protection remained practically unaltered.
9.1.2 From 1947 Onward: A New Form of Protectionism
By the end of WWII, Mexico promoted an inward-looking development
strategy in which protectionist policies played a central role. Unlike early
twentieth-century protectionism, the new instruments of commercial pol-
icy were mainly ad valorem rates and quantitative controls, both intro-
duced in 1947. Whereas ad valorem rates isolated tariﬀprotection from the
eroding eﬀect of inﬂation on speciﬁc rates, quantitative controls elevated
protection beyond the level provided by tariﬀs. Thus, inward-looking poli-
cies adopted during the postwar era erected a new form of protectionism
by redeﬁning tariﬀ protection and introducing quantitative controls.
In an attempt to avoid the erosion of the protective power of tariﬀs, the
Mexican authorities shifted from speciﬁc to ad valorem tariﬀs in Novem-
ber 1947. The government set a list of oﬃcial prices for the computation of
ad valorem rates, but importers were required to use invoice prices in case
these were higher. By setting ad valorem rates and oﬃcial prices, policy-
makers controlled the level of nominal tariﬀ protection conferred on do-
mestic producers, thus eliminating the major disadvantage of speciﬁc rates.
In addition, the government recovered a certain degree of ﬂexibility by in-
troducing the list of oﬃcial prices, since increases in these prices require no
more than an Executive decree, whereas tariﬀ increases entailed cumber-
some procedures including congressional authorization.
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Table 9.1 Average ad valorem tariﬀs by sector (%)
Sector 1935–1939 1939–1944
Animal products 23 18
Vegetable products 40 28
Mineral products 20 14
Textiles and yarns 50 29
Textile manufactures 70 52
Chemicals 12 8
Sundry manufactures 32 23
Machinery and apparatus 5 3
Automobiles and its components 14 10
Source: Oﬁcina de Estudios Especiales (1944), p. 252.Between 1947 and 1960, changes in tariﬀrates and oﬃcial prices aﬀected
individual categories, yet none of these modiﬁcations aimed at a particular
group of imports (King 1970, 75). Similarly, when commercial policy was
used to ameliorate balance-of-payments problems, the government imple-
mented undiﬀerentiated tariﬀ increases. This was the case in 1954, when a
decree elevated all tariﬀ rates by 25 percent as a complementary measure
to the devaluation of the peso. After this episode, ad valorem tariﬀ rates
changes occurred rarely, indicating that tariﬀ policy was no longer the in-
strument for the promotion of industrial growth. In its place, nontariﬀ de-
vices occupied a central role in the industrialization strategy of the mid-
twentieth century.
Rules for quantitative restrictions on imports were ﬁrst announced in
1944, but they were actually applied until 1947. Import licenses were ﬁrst
used as a device to reduce imports in the face of balance of payments prob-
lems after the WWII. In an early stage, licenses applied only to luxury
goods; in 1947 controlled imports represented 18 percent of total imports.
But the number of categories subject to licenses soared in the following
years. Table 9.2 shows the proportion of controlled imports in total from
1956 to 1964. In 1956, 27 percent of total imports were subject to licenses,
whereas in 1964 the proportion grew to 65 percent. By groups, all imports
in the beverages and tobacco industries required licenses in 1963, whereas
manufactured goods and arms and munitions were the only groups in
which controlled imports were less than 50 percent of the total (see table
9.2).
How did the license system work? The list of controlled imports de-
pended on public and private initiatives. The government took an active
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Table 9.2 Participation of controlled imports in total
Average 
Sector 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1956–65
Total 27.7 35.1 42.5 43.2 37.8 53.6 52.5 63.3 65.4 46.8
Food 18.8 4.4 66.7 25.6 28.2 46.7 65.8 83.6 64.1 44.9
Drink and tobacco 45.2 47.6 34.2 20.0 33.1 23.2 99.9 100.0 99.9 55.9
Raw materials 23.4 27.5 39.6 36.1 36.6 41.1 71.1 68.3 62.9 45.2
Fuels and lubricants 40.0 40.0 39.5 95.5 91.8 87.6 92.0 86.2 83.6 73.0
Chemical products 76.2 71.3 57.1 83.2 73.7 93.5 67.0 72.7 76.6 74.6
Fats and oils 37.3 39.3 43.9 42.7 41.3 67.8 44.8 45.1 55.9 46.5
Manufactures, 
classiﬁed by 47.5 54.4 50.0 57.3 54.5 66.7 68.3 63.7 60.4 58.1
Machinery and 
equipment 25.3 36.1 39.5 42.3 33.4 50.1 48.6 66.7 71.0 45.9
Manufactured goods 8.5 12.8 16.8 17.6 15.7 21.5 28.3 27.4 30.4 19.9
Arms and munitions 44.0 45.1 36.9 51.3 52.8 79.0 18.4 56.4 36.1 46.7
Source: León Figueroa, 1966.role in determining the list of imports subject to control in 1947 and 1954,
both corresponding to episodes of balance-of-payments adjustments.
Private interests channeled their demands for protection through appli-
cations ﬁled in the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Applicants provided
information on costs, prices, production, and distribution capacity. A
committee consisting of representatives from industrial and importers’
organizations, as well as oﬃcials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade,
ﬁrst reviewed applications and then submitted a recommendation to the
ministry. In the early 1960s, more than thirty diﬀerent committees re-
viewed the 3,000 applications ﬁled, on average, each week. According to
King (1970, 79), the committees had almost no inﬂuence on the decisions
taken in the period 1955–58, when recommendations were rarely taken
into account. Still, the participation of the private sector in the decision-
making process oﬀered manufacturers an opportunity to “learn something
about the market for a number of products still imported.”
Licenses for products on the list of controlled imports required another
application, whose approval took between four to six weeks. Importers had
to document why the product in question was needed. According to Ger-
ardo Bueno (1971, 182), the Ministry of Industry and Trade approved only
one third of the applications. An excessive administrative burden on in-
dustrialists and contraband were two side eﬀects of licenses. In addition,
lack of coordination between the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of
Industry and Trade ensured that the license system as a device to face
balance-of-payments problems was rarely implemented.10
Had the new type of protectionism any role in explaining patterns of
growth for individual industries? Up tot his point we have only referred to
average nominal protection. A better indicator of protection, known as the
eﬀective rate of protection, discounts the protection conferred on inputs
from the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal product. It is also possible to compute the im-
plicit rate of protection, by directly comparing price diﬀerentials between
domestic products and potential competing imports. Unfortunately, these
two measures of protection require detailed information that is not avail-
able for the years before 1960. Using some estimates of eﬀective and im-
plicit rates of protection for 1960, it is possible to infer some of the growth
pattern shaped by protectionist policies after 1947.
Table 9.3 compares nominal and eﬀective rates of tariﬀ protection for
ten economic sectors.11 The eﬀective rate of protection rose above nominal
protection in industrial sectors, contrasting with the case of primary sec-
tors (agriculture, mining, and energy), where nominal rates were higher
than the eﬀective rates of protection. This is typical of a policy that aims at
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10. For a critical assessment of the license system see Bueno (1972, 151).
11. Note that industry classiﬁcation in table 9.3 is diﬀerent from that in table 9.2. Such dis-
crepancy is due to the aggregation problems when using either trade data or production data.
This problem persists throughout the paper. Unfortunately, this is an issue beyond this paper.promoting the development of manufactures. In particular, the gap be-
tween nominal and eﬀective protection widened in consumer goods indus-
tries like food products, clothing, textiles, and shoes. As a response to tariﬀ
protection, the process of import substitution in these branches advanced
swiftly and was almost complete by the late 1950s. However, a pattern of
protection that was extended over time caused serious diﬃculties for long-
term growth. Domestic producers did not achieve international competi-
tive standards and their growth depended on the behavior of internal de-
mand.12 A study of Mexican industry conducted by the Finance Ministry
and the Bank of Mexico concluded that consumer goods industries not
only ranked among the less-dynamic areas, but also that they depended
heavily on tariﬀ protection. This study singled out food, beverages, to-
bacco shoes, clothing, and textiles as areas of slow growth during the 1950–
65 period.13
In addition to tariﬀs, domestic producers enjoyed price margins derived
from quantitative controls. Yet, a diﬀerentiated pattern in the use of this
advantage was closely related to the levels of tariﬀ protection. Table 9.3
shows that eﬀective tariﬀ rates were higher than those found in price diﬀ-
erentials (eﬀective implicit rates) in six sectors, which indicates that do-
mestic producers in these areas did not fully exploit the margins provided
by tariﬀs. Therefore, licensing and other quantitative controls became a re-
dundant source of protection for sectors for which tariﬀs already provided
a suﬃcient price margin over competing imports. Extreme cases of the re-
dundancy of licenses were food products, clothing, textiles, and shoes,
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Table 9.3 Nominal and eﬀective rates of protection, 1960 (%)
Eﬀective
Sector Nominal tariﬀ Tariﬀ protection Implicit protection
Agricultural production 6.7 1.7 3.7
Mining 4.6 1.8 13.0
Fuels and oils 3.0 1.2 9.7
Food products 55.9 108.3 47.7
Clothing, textiles, and shoes 55.2 83.1 26.5
Wood and paper 33.8 50.9 24.2
Chemical products 17.8 21.1 24.5
Nonmetallic mineral products 29.5 46.8 0.7
Basic metallic products 19.3 30.0 46.6
Machinery and miscellaneous 31.6 51.5 45.2
Source: King (1970, tables 6.1 and 6.3, 129–131).
12. Cárdenas argues that by the early 1950s, domestic ﬁrms supplied 95 percent of domes-
tic demand in textiles, food products, beverages, tobacco products, shoes, soap, rubber, alco-
hol, and glass industries (see Cárdenas 2003, 257).
13. See México, Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público (1966, 8–9).where the eﬀective rates diﬀered more than ﬁfty percentage points. Costs
reductions, the smuggling trade, price control policies, and a potential shift
in the application of licenses might explain the behavior of price setting in
the presence of excessive tariﬀ protection. In sectors where domestic pro-
tection was required to fully exploit tariﬀ protection and the licensing sys-
tem, the eﬀective rate of protection implicit in price diﬀerentials was higher
than the eﬀective rate of protection.
A closer look at the manufacturing sector demonstrates the eﬀects of
tariﬀlevels and licenses. Table 9.4shows that in fourteen manufacturing ar-
eas the eﬀective rate was higher than the implicit tariﬀrate. This group con-
sisted mostly of traditional industries where tariﬀ protection dated as
far back as the Porﬁrian era. Industrialists secured nominal tariﬀ protec-
tion for their ﬁnished products and tariﬀ reductions for their inputs over
decades of lobbying and negotiations with the government. Beverages, tex-
tiles, shoes and clothing, soap, and metal manufactures are some examples
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Table 9.4 Eﬀective tariﬀ and implicit rates of protection, 1960 (%)




Soft textiles 83.1 35.5
Shoes and clothing 73.5 6.9
Soap and detergents 67.7 1.0
Pulp and paper 65.1 31.0
Metal manufactures 64.4 19.8
Other textiles 50.6 38.2
Printing 49.6 9.3
Other food products 48.6 44.9
Nonmetallic products 36.9 –0.2
Synthetic ﬁbers 32.9 26.9
Wood and cork 32.8 26.8
Meat and dairy products 77.4 102.1
Motor vehicles 57.1 83.1
Other manufactures 45.6 50.3
Electrical machinery 44.2 49.4
Basic metals 43.4 48.6
Other chemicals 34.5 59.3
Rubber 31.3 49.1
Basic chemicals 22.7 41.4
Perfumes and cosmetics 20.8 25.6
Fertilizers and insecticides 8.2 11.1
Pharmaceutical products 6.5 11.2
Nonelectrical machinery 6.0 34.3
Transport equipment 4.6 29.8
Source: King (1970, 132).of manufacturing areas for which import substitution relied primarily on
tariﬀ protection.
Another thirteen branches representing intermediate goods, consumer
durables machinery, and transport equipment required quantitative con-
trols in addition to tariﬀ protection to close the gap between domestic and
world prices. These sectors maintained lower tariﬀs for various reasons:
users requested tariﬀ reduction to control costs, and production of this
type of product took oﬀ when policy instruments privileged the use of
quantitative controls. In the chemical industry, the average proportion of
controlled imports in the period 1956–64 was above any other industry (see
table 9.1).
In sum, tariﬀs and quantitative controls, the two main components of
the pattern of protectionism in the postwar era, produced a diﬀerentiated
eﬀect in the manufacturing sector. For traditional industries, quantitative
controls became redundant in the presence of excessive levels of tariﬀ pro-
tection, whereas the promotion of import substitution in branches pro-
ducing intermediate and durable consumer goods depended heavily on an
extensive system of import licenses. More importantly, however, is that
starting in 1947 the combination of tariﬀ and nontariﬀ instruments gave
rise to a generalized system of protection for domestic producers in Mex-
ico, and with that, the Mexican economy became, de facto, a much more
closed economy than it used to be. In the next two sections, we evaluate two
likely implications of this commercial policy.
9.3 Eﬀects of Closing the Economy on Skilled Labor 
Employment and Wages
By the mid-twentieth century, Mexico was clearly an unskilled, labor-
abundant country: for example, in 1940, 54 percent of the population older
than ﬁfteen years was still illiterate, and even in 1950, only 5.4 percent of
the population older than ﬁfteen years had attained some postprimary ed-
ucation. Therefore, closing the economy, according to the standard inter-
national trade theory, should have had speciﬁc implications on the inten-
sity of use of diﬀerent types of labor, as well as on skilled-unskilled relative
wages. The reasoning is as follows: when an economy is open to interna-
tional trade, relative wages are only a function of technological parameters
and relative prices, and they do not depend on supply and demand param-
eters. However, when the economy gets closed, supply and demand factors
start aﬀecting relative wages. Now, because the economy is closed, and it
cannot longer specialize in the production of goods that intensively use its
abundant factors, domestic production will shift from unskilled labor to-
ward skilled labor-intensive sectors. This, in turn, will increase demand for
skilled labor and reduce demand for unskilled workers, thus producing an
increase in the relative wage of skilled workers.
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reduce the use intensity of the factor that has become relatively more ex-
pensive, that is, skilled labor, and to increase the demand for the factor that
has become relatively less expensive, unskilled labor. As a result of these
eﬀects, the mix and the use intensity of labor factors in each sector should
change and we should observe the following results: higher relative wages
for skilled workers, an increase in the use intensity of unskilled workers
across the economy, and an increase in the production and employment
of skilled labor-intensive sectors. Of course, the composition of the labor
supply is usually changing over time, and therefore we should take that into
account when evaluating labor market eﬀects of trade policies.
9.3.1 Methodology
In order to test whether this implication of standard international trade
theory actually occurred when the Mexican economy closed, we will use a
methodology that has been widely applied in studies of the labor market
eﬀects of recent trade liberalization policies.14 The methodology provides
a simple decomposition of changes in the skilled-labor employment and
skilled-labor wage bill shares into two diﬀerent components: between-
industry and within-industry terms. The decomposition is the following:
(1)      ∑
j
sj     ∑
j   j sj
where subindex j refers to industry j,
LS   skilled labor
LU   unskilled labor
and sj   ,
so that sj is the employment share of industry j.
Equation (1) decomposes the total change in the skilled-labor employ-
ment share of the economy (the left-hand side term) on two components:
the ﬁrst right-hand side term denotes the within-industryeﬀect, which is the
change in the skilled-labor employment share at the industry level for a
given industry employment share (sj), whereas the second right-hand side
term is the between-industryeﬀect, which captures the change in the indus-
try employment shares for given skilled-labor employment shares at the in-
dustry level. An analogous procedure is used to decompose changes in the
wage bill for skilled labor.
(LU   LS)j   
LU   LS
LS
 
LU   LS
LS
 
LU   LS
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LU   LS
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14. See, for example, Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), Cañonero and Werner (2002),
and Gonzaga, Menezes-Filho, and Terra (2002) and Meza (2003).9.3.2 Data and Results
To implement equation (1) for the Mexican case during the period when
the economy was closed, we compiled statistical information from the
Mexican Industrial Census of 1935, 1945, 1955, and 1965.15 We have data
on the number of blue collar and white collar workers at the industry level
as well as data on the wage bill of each type of labor for a subset of 64 in-
dustries. These industries represent close to 70 percent of total output and
total employment in every census year. We have not made use of informa-
tion from all industries due to comparability problems and because infor-
mation about certain industries could not be found at all.
As it is standard in the literature, we will associate blue collar (produc-
tion) workers with unskilled workers and white collar (nonproduction)
workers with skilled workers. Of course, we acknowledge that such a
simple classiﬁcation is far from ideal, but we have no other information
available at the individual level that could help us to overcome this prob-
lem (i.e., we do not have data on type of employment or on educational
level).16
The results of our decomposition are shown in table 9.5. Before com-
menting on this table, it is worth discussing the role of a changing labor
supply, which could also be aﬀecting our results. If the labor supply of
skilled people was growing relative to that of unskilled workers (as surely it
was during the period when the economy was closed) and if commercial
policy had played no role at all in the labor market, then this situation
would be reﬂected through a reduction in the relative wages of skilled
workers and through an expansion of the industries which use the skilled
labor factor more intensively. That is, it would generate a positive between-
industry eﬀect. In addition to that, the reduction in skilled-labor relative
wages would induce a generalized increase in the use of skilled labor in the
economy, and therefore would generate an increase in the employment of
this type of labor in all industries, i.e., a positive within-industry eﬀect.
However, it should be noted that these results should necessarily be ac-
companied by a reduction in the relative wage of skilled labor.
On the contrary, if labor supply were unchanged, and all the eﬀects on
the labor markets were only the result of commercial policy, we should ex-
pect to observe an increase in the relative wages of skilled workers and an
increase in the relative price of skill-intensive sectors. This, in turn, should
be reﬂected into a positive between-industry eﬀect and a negative within-
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15. We did not use information from the ﬁrst Mexican Industrial Census of 1930 due to data
comparability problems.
16. Results in Krueger (1997) and Slaughter (2000) suggest that using either education or
production status information produce similar results for the case of the United States. How-
ever, note that in some cases classiﬁcation decisions could be relevant (see Gonzaga,
Menezes-Filho, and Terra 2002).industry eﬀect. The last result would follow from the natural reaction of in-
dustries to the increase in the relative wages of skilled workers.
Table 9.5 shows the results of our decomposition for both the employ-
ment and the wage bill share of skilled labor in Mexico for diﬀerent subpe-
riods between 1935 and 1965. There are several interesting results: ﬁrst, the
share of skilled labor employment increased in the Mexican industry be-
tween 1935 and 1955. However, between 1955 and 1965, the share of skilled
labor employment decreased. Note that in all cases both eﬀects go in the
same direction, thus reinforcing each other. In fact, between 1935 and 1965
the share of skilled labor in Mexico increased by 7.6 percentage points,
with half of this increase explained by between-industry adjustments and
the other half by within-industry changes.
In terms of the wage bill for skilled labor, the bottom panel of table 9.2
shows that it increased substantially and continuously since 1935. Indeed,
between 1935 and 1965 the wage bill share of skilled labor increased by
more than 17 percentage points, with most of the increase taking place af-
ter 1945. Note that, as with the employment eﬀects, almost half of the in-
crease in the wage bill came as a result of between-industry movements and
the other half from within-industry adjustments.
More importantly, however, is the fact that the increase in the wage bill
for skilled workers in all subperiods, with the exception of the 1935–1945
period, was greater than the increase in the share of skilled labor employ-
ment. This means that not only were there more skilled workers being em-
ployed in the Mexican industry, but also that the remuneration they were
receiving was growing relative to that of unskilled workers.
The pattern of employment, wage bill, and relative wages for skilled la-
Economic Eﬀects of Closing the Economy: The Mexican Experience 347
Table 9.5 Changes in employment and wage bill shares for skilled labor in
Mexico’s industry
Period Total Within Between
Decomposition of changes in skilled labor
1935–45 0.044 0.024 0.020
1945–55 0.060 0.036 0.023
1955–65 –0.027 –0.023 –0.004
1935–55 0.104 0.066 0.038
1945–65 0.032 0.012 0.021
1935–65 0.076 0.038 0.038
Decomposition of changes in skilled labor wage bill
1935–45 0.015 0.001 0.015
1945–55 0.124 0.079 0.045
1955–65 0.036 0.018 0.018
1935–55 0.140 0.093 0.047
1945–65 0.160 0.096 0.064
1935–65 0.175 0.089 0.086bor in Mexico between 1945 and 1965 is not compatible with a pure labor
supply story. Instead, it is perfectly compatible with a labor supply story
combined with the eﬀects of a commercial policy that protected domestic
industries and therefore shifted resources from the production of unskilled
labor-intensive sectors toward skilled labor-intensive production.17 More-
over, the reduction in the share of skilled-labor employment that took
place between 1955 and 1965 is also compatible with the substantial rise in
the wage premium for skilled labor that occurred between 1945 and 1965.
In that sense, we may conclude that the behavior of employment, wage bill,
and relative wages for skilled labor in Mexico after 1945 is compatible with
the implications of standard trade policy models when an economy gets
closed. In that regard, these results provide a strong and unequivocal sup-
port in favor of the labor market implications of standard trade theory
models. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the ambiguous results
that have been typically obtained in studies analyzing the opening of an
economy. This suggests that studying cases of closing an economy in more
detail could help to shed light on debates about the labor market implica-
tions of commercial policy.
9.4 Eﬀects of Closing the Economy on the Regional Dispersion 
of Economic Activity in Mexico
There are several recent papers that relate trade to geographic aspects.
One line of study analyzes whether trade policy aﬀects the regional disper-
sion of economic activity. For example, there is a line of research that com-
bines elements from trade, agglomeration economies, and geography. A
far-from-exhaustive list of papers along these lines includes Krugman and
Hanson (1996), Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) and Krugman and
Venables (1996). These papers argue that as a result of greater economic in-
tegration, there may be a shift in the relevant market for domestic produc-
ers, who may want to reallocate their economic activities in order to attend
the enlarged market, not only the domestic market. If this occurs and there
are agglomeration economies, this may prompt a circular cumulative pro-
cess of increases in demand and economic activity in a completely diﬀer-
ent region from the one that predominated before the economic integra-
tion. Not surprisingly, most of these papers were somehow inspired by
NAFTA and their likely implications for the Mexican economy. Indeed,
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17. This result seems, at ﬁrst sight, incompatible with empirical evidence presented in Han-
son and Harrison (1999), wherein they argue that the structure of protection in Mexico was
designed to protect unskilled labor-intensive sectors. However, they are not necessarily in-
compatible for at least two reasons: ﬁrst, because they focused on the structure of production
in the 1980s, which was obviously diﬀerent from that in the 1940s or 1950s, and second, be-
cause what they actually showed is that the reduction in trade barriers in Mexico in the 1980s
was more dramatic in low-skill industries—not that they were the only sectors being pro-
tected.Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1995) even suggested that the inward-
looking policy followed in Mexico could have produced a pattern of in-
dustrial concentration in and around Mexico City.
Hanson (1996b) has emphasized the role of regional production net-
works to attempt to identify the pattern of production in a country that
moves from an import-substitution strategy to a more open regime. His
model has location economies arising from the provision of specialized
inputs and congestion costs created by agglomeration. The model empha-
sizes the fact that for a developing country, trade openness involves
moving from a vertically integrated industry towards a more specialized 
pattern of production, probably through subcontracting with developed-
country ﬁrms. He concluded that NAFTA would not only shift relatively
unskilled jobs to Mexico, but also that there would be a substantial reallo-
cation of jobs within Mexico, since these would move from Mexico City to
the U.S. border region.
In one of the few empirical applications of this line of research, Hanson
(2001) studied whether integration between Mexico and the United States
has contributed to the expansion of economic activity at the border. The
intuition is that if transport costs are the main nontrade policy barrier to
trade, the elimination of all trade policy barriers should provide a geo-
graphical advantage to the border cities. His results tend to support the hy-
pothesis that integration produces an expansion of economic activity at
the border. He ﬁnds that an increase in exports from Mexican cities to the
United States increases labor demand in the neighboring U.S. city.
In sum, this line of analysis suggests that, as a result of greater trade
openness, port and border cities will tend to attract higher levels of eco-
nomic activity. In the remaining parts of this section, we discuss the possi-
bility that closing the economy could have aﬀected the dispersion of eco-
nomic activity in Mexico in the opposite way—that is, provoking a greater
concentration in the main domestic markets and reducing the dispersion
of economic activity.
9.4.1 Methodology
We will compute two diﬀerent measures of regional dispersion of eco-
nomic activity. On the one hand, we will compute Krugman’s index of re-
gional specialization. On the other, we will compute Hoover’s coeﬃcient of
localization.18
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18. Both indexes have been used, amongst others, by Kim (1995).Eij is the level of employment in industry i   1, . . . , n and region j, and
Ej is the total industrial employment for region j and similarly for re-
gion k.
On the other hand, Hoover’s coeﬃcient of localization is based on the
location quotient, which is deﬁned as
Lij   ⁄
where Eijand Ej are deﬁned as before, Eimexis total employment in industry
i in Mexico, and Emex is total industry employment in Mexico. Note that if
the location quotient is greater (smaller) than one, region j has a higher
(smaller) share of employment in industry i relative to its share of total in-
dustry employment.
With the location quotient estimates we then proceed to construct the lo-
calization curve for each industry. This curve is built in a similar fashion to
a Lorenz curve. That is, ﬁrst we rank the regions by their Lij estimates for a
given i in descending order, then we plot the cumulative percentage of to-
tal industry employment over the regions in the x-axis and the cumulative
percentage of employment in industry i over the regions in the y-axis. Of
course, both cumulative series add up to 100 percent. Note that if employ-
ment in industry i is distributed in the same pattern as total employment,
then location quotients for each region would be all equal to one and the
localization curve would be a 45-degree line. However, if that were not the
case, then the localization curve would be always above the 45-degree line.
Therefore, we may compute the coeﬃcient of localization as the area be-
tween the 45-degree line and the localization curve divided by the entire
upper triangular area. Note that the coeﬃcient of localization is analogous
to the Gini coeﬃcient.
9.4.2 Results
Table 9.6 shows the results of calculating the specialization index for
seven Mexican regions for speciﬁc years between 1940 and 1965. Data
come from the industrial census of the corresponding years. A map of
Mexico and the deﬁnition of Mexican regions are included in the appen-
dix.
Results in table 9.6 show several interesting aspects of regional develop-
ment in Mexico. For example, it shows that the industrial composition (as
deﬁned by industry employment characteristics) in the capital region of
Mexico is indeed relatively diﬀerent from that of the rest of the country.
This can be inferred from the fact that the value of the index for all region
pairs that include the capital region are almost always above unity, with the
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throughout this period was the northern region of Mexico. Table 9.6 also
shows that the most similar regions in Mexico during this period were the
South and the center-North before 1955 and the South and the Paciﬁc af-
ter 1955.
Interestingly, table 9.6 does not show any speciﬁc trend in terms of re-
gional specialization throughout the period. In fact, the only signiﬁcant
pattern is a generalized increase in all coeﬃcients related to the capital and
center regions between 1945 and 1955. Such increases, however, were re-
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Table 9.6 Mexico’s regions: Specialization Index (Krugman), 1940–1965




Center-North 1.201 0.870 0.0
Gulf 1.298 1.265 1.474 0.0
North 1.018 1.092 0.755 1.321 0.0
Paciﬁc 1.060 0.843 0.842 0.957 0.919 0.0




Center-North 1.042 0.944 0.0
Gulf 1.293 1.274 1.349 0.0
North 1.008 1.078 0.822 1.217 0.0
Paciﬁc 0.991 0.862 0.987 1.054 1.029 0.0




Center-North 1.387 1.220 0.0
Gulf 1.620 1.280 1.181 0.0
North 1.321 1.356 0.887 1.185 0.0
Paciﬁc 1.269 1.153 0.854 0.949 0.945 0.0




Center-North 1.096 0.952 0.0
Gulf 1.406 1.241 1.217 0.0
North 1.028 1.125 0.805 1.204 0.0
Paciﬁc 0.991 0.991 0.674 0.995 0.826 0.0
South 1.257 0.932 0.839 1.167 0.976 0.706 0.0verted in the next decade. In most cases (13 out of 21 region pairs), the in-
dex of specialization in 1965 was indeed lower than in 1945. These results
suggest that regional specialization in Mexico was not substantially af-
fected by the change in commercial policy implemented since 1947 or, in
any case, the eﬀects were short-lived, and they did not have permanent
eﬀects on regional specialization in Mexico.
Table 9.7 shows the results of computing the Hoover’s coeﬃcient of lo-
calization for Mexican industries for selected years between 1940 and
1965. We have grouped industries according to their pattern of geographic
concentration between 1945 and 1965. A few industries showed an erratic
pattern in their index and therefore they are not included in this table. Table
9.7 is divided into three panels. The top panel includes industries that show
a relatively stable pattern throughout the period, while the panel in the
middle includes industries that show a declining trend in the value of their
index. Finally, the bottom panel includes those industries that present an
upward trend in the value of their index. The ﬁrst interesting result to no-
tice is the relatively large value of the localization index for Mexican in-
dustry. For example, in 1945 the unweighted average value of the index was
0.652, while in 1965 it had diminished to 0.596. These values stand in sharp
contrast with analogous measures for the U.S. industry reported in Kim
(1995), where the unweighted average of the localization index was 0.327
and 0.284 in 1947a and 1967, respectively.
The top panel of table 9.7 shows that the geographical dispersion of
twelve Mexican industries remained practically stable between 1945 and
1965. Most of these industries already had relatively high values of their
coeﬃcient of localization (with only one exception, all industries had an
initial index above 0.67, and their index average in 1940 was 0.846), which
means that they were already very highly concentrated within relatively
few states in Mexico. This is mainly the case of industries associated to a
certain type of raw material that can only be found in speciﬁc states (this is
the case of the hackled sisal, coke, coal mining, and oil and gas industries).
However, there are other highly concentrated industries that seem to be as-
sociated with the existence of a certain knowledge or skill, or even by a cer-
tain inertia in their degree of localization. This seems to be the case of the
pharmaceutical and perfumes and cosmetics industries.
Table 9.7 also shows that relatively more industries present a declining
trend in their index of localization than otherwise. The average index of
these industries decreased from 0.767 in 1940 to 0.482 in 1965. Interest-
ingly, the industries that present this pattern come from the whole range of
the initial distribution of the localization index. For example, in this case
we have industries that were completely concentrated in 1940, like tanks
and metallic structures and metal furniture, but also industries like pastries
and bakeries, which were already very dispersed by 1940. All of these in-
dustries present an important reduction in their localization index, which
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Industry 1940 1945 1955 1965
Coal mining 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Coke and other mineral coal products 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.974
Hackled sisal 0.961 0.986 0.985 0.942
Inks of all kinds 0.861 0.974 0.983 0.932
Pharmaceutical products of all kinds 0.933 0.939 0.915 0.947
Gin and packing cotton plants 0.920 0.920 0.968 0.887
Perfumes and cosmetics 0.935 0.907 0.931 0.963
Coﬀee 0.861 0.831 0.886 0.813
Oil and gas 0.760 0.797 0.666 0.790
Paints and varnishes 0.799 0.779 0.846 0.823
Wood conservation and preparation 0.670 0.733 0.698 n.a.
Cotton textiles and manufactures thereof 0.451 0.398 0.483 0.464
Average 0.846 0.855 0.863 0.867
Tanks and metallic structures 1.00 1.000 0.442 0.600
Paper manufactures of all kinds 0.916 0.972 0.921 0.724
Metal furniture 1.000 0.971 0.894 0.790
Rubber manufactures of all kinds 0.960 0.955 0.942 0.837
Iron and steel 0.824 0.889 0.554 0.589
Hats and caps 0.908 0.873 0.379 0.482
Basic chemicals 0.907 0.839 0.883 0.430
Baking powder, hops and maize products 0.870 0.829 0.426 0.356
Cardboard manufactures of all kinds 0.817 0.814 0.779 0.686
Clothing 0.772 0.759 0.728 0.425
Cardboard, and cardboard in sheets 0.866 0.747 0.381 0.637
Glass 0.840 0.746 0.705 0.590
Agave beverages excepting pulque 0.757 0.662 0.646 0.635
Nonelectrical machinery and equipment 0.564 0.658 0.431 0.302
Woolen textiles 0.678 0.652 0.473 0.568
Workers Uniforms 0.769 0.645 0.582 n.a.
Metallurgical plants and metallic mining 0.641 0.605 0.312 n.a.
Cement 0.725 0.560 0.327 0.243
Coﬀee mills and roasting shops 0.634 0.559 0.548 0.315
Repairing shops for nonelectrical machinery 
and equipment 0.591 0.311 0.358 0.364
Pastries and alimentary pastes of ﬂour 0.652 0.306 0.332 0.310
Metallurgical plants and metallic mining 0.377 0.287 0.331 0.148
Bakeries 0.568 0.239 0.089 0.098
Average 0.767 0.690 0.542 0.482
Metallic beds 0.772 0.837 0.863 n.a.
Sugar 0.609 0.668 0.748 0.680
Wire manufactures, wire fences, and wire sheets 0.861 0.662 0.960 0.883
Beer 0.623 0.495 0.574 0.586
Metallic mining 0.499 0.467 0.679 0.674
Sawmills 0.430 0.440 0.579 0.583
Wheat mills 0.476 0.326 0.392 0.385
Soap of all kinds 0.477 0.321 0.469 0.754
Ice 0.411 0.217 0.396 0.414
Nixtamal (maize) mills 0.136 0.165 0.278 0.373
Average 0.529 0.4597 0.5938 0.5925
Note: n.a.   not available.means that they tended to become more dispersed throughout the country
between 1945 and 1965.
The bottom panel of table 9.7 shows that there are ten industries with an
increase in their index of localization after 1945. This group includes some
industries where the increase was only observed between 1945 and 1955,
but most cases show an increase between 1945 and 1965. All in all, in-
creases in the index of localization were moderate: the unweighted index
for these industries increased only from 0.46 to 0.59 between 1945 and
1965. The most noticeable case is the soap industry, which increased from
0.32 in 1945 to 0.75 in 1965. This case is interesting because it is one of
those industries that had a relatively large tariﬀ protection, and therefore
we could think that it is probably the only industry that seems to ﬁt the pre-
dicted pattern of regional concentration after being protected. However,
not even this case may ﬁt the prediction of the geography and trade litera-
ture, for at least two reasons: ﬁrst, this industry had beneﬁted from tariﬀ
protection well before the 1940s (therefore, it is not clear why it should be-
come more concentrated now), and second, the implicit protection level for
this industry was nil (1 percent; see table 9.4).
Figures 9.2 and 9.3 illustrate the patterns of regional dispersion of eco-
nomic activity that took place in two Mexican industries after 1945. These
are the cases of the soap industry, which is the only one that somehow ﬁts
the predictions of models of geography and trade, and the cement indus-
try, which is one of the industries that was widely dispersed throughout the
country, despite the fact that it was also a heavily protected industry. As
mentioned before, most industries behaved in a similar fashion to the ce-
ment industry, and therefore their patterns of dispersion of regional activ-
ity closely resemble the one shown in ﬁgure 9.3.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence based on the specialization and lo-
calization indexes does not provide strong support for the implications of
the geography and trade literature for the case of a closing economy. The
evidence from the specialization index shows that if there was any eﬀect, it
was short-lived. On the other hand, the evidence from the localization in-
dex shows that there was no pattern of further regional concentration for
most industries. Furthermore, the only industry that seems to have become
more concentrated (the soap industry) does not necessarily ﬁt the case of a
recently protected industry.
Of course, there are some caveats to this conclusion. It could be the case
that some industries tended to concentrate around a few domestic markets
and that they may still show a tendency toward decentralization. This may
be the case in those industries producing ﬁnal goods and that could have
increased their presence in some states associated to large cities (which
could be the case of the states of Nuevo Leon and Jalisco, where the im-
portant cities of Monterrey and Guadalajara are located). However, we
consider that the bulk of the empirical evidence is against the idea that
354 Gerardo Esquivel and Graciela MárquezFig. 9.2 Soap industry: Regional dispersion of industry employment, 1940–1965Fig. 9.3 Cement industry: Regional dispersion of industry employment, 
1940–1965closing the economy led to a higher regional concentration of economic ac-
tivity in the Mexican economy.
9.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that the Mexican economy started to be-
come a closed economy in 1947. In that year, commercial policy in Mexico
shifted from a traditional, industry-speciﬁc protectionist scheme based on
tariﬀs toward a generalized protectionist policy based on nontariﬀ instru-
ments (quotas and import licenses). This scheme of protection is the one
that prevailed until the mid-eighties, when the economy began to open up
to trade with the rest of the world.
We have evaluated two economic implications of closing the economy
that were derived from standard international trade models or from more
recent trade and geography literature. Our results show that the behav-
ior of employment, wage bill, and relative wages for skilled labor in Mex-
ico after 1945 strongly support the labor market implications of standard
trade theory models, and are in line with predictions based on the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. As mentioned before, this conclusion diﬀers from the
ambiguous results that have typically been obtained in studies analyzing
the opening up of an economy and that have led some authors to declare
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem dead (Davis 2005). This result suggests
that studying cases of closing an economy in more detail could help to shed
light on debates about the labor market implications of commercial policy.
On the other hand, the empirical evidence on the dispersion of regional
economic activity in Mexico after 1945 does not provide strong support for
the implications of the geography and trade literature for the case of a clos-
ing economy. The evidence from the specialization index shows that if there
was any eﬀect, it was short lived. On the other hand, the evidence from the
localization index shows that there was no pattern of further regional con-
centration for most industries.
In general, we believe that moving away from the typical case of study-
ing a liberalized economy in order to evaluate the implications of trade the-
ory models, toward the study of the reverse implications for an economy
that is being closed, can help us shed light on the validity of some implica-
tions of standard trade models, this could be an interesting line of analysis
to pursue in the future.
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State No. Region State No. Region
Baja California 2 North Distrito Federal 9 Capital
Chihuahua 6 North México 15 Capital
Coahuila de Zaragoza 7 North
Nuevo León 19 North Hidalgo 13 Center
Sonora 26 North Morelos 17 Center
Tamaulipas 28 North Puebla 21 Center
Tlaxcala 29 Center
Baja California Sur 3 Paciﬁc
Colima 8 Paciﬁc Campeche 4 Gulf
Jalisco 14 Paciﬁc Quintana Roo 23 Gulf
Nayarit 18 Paciﬁc Tabasco 27 Gulf
Sinaloa 25 Paciﬁc Veracruz 30 Gulf
Yucatán 31 Gulf
Aguascalientes 1 Center-North
Durango 10 Center-North Chiapas 5 South
Guanajuato 11 Center-North Guerrero 12 South
Querétaro 22 Center-North Michoacán 16 South
San Luis Potosi 24 Center-North Oaxaca 20 South
Zacatecas 32 Center-NorthReferences
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